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Abstract 
Objective: A series of experiments examined human operators’ strategies for 
interacting with highly (93%) reliable automated decision aids in a binary signal detection 
task.  
Background: Operators often interact with automated decision aids in a suboptimal 
way, achieving performance levels lower than predicted by a statistically ideal model of 
information integration. To better understand operators’ inefficient use of decision aids, the 
current study compared participants’ automation-aided performance levels to the predictions 
of seven statistical models of collaborative decision making.  
Method: Participants performed a binary signal detection task that asked them to 
classify random dot images as either blue- or orange-dominant. They made their judgments 
either unaided or with assistance from a 93%-reliable automated decision aid that provided 
either graded (Experiments 1 and 3) or binary (Experiment 2) cues. Analysis compared 
automation-aided performance to the predictions of seven statistical models of collaborative 
decision making, including a statistically optimal model (Sorkin & Dai, 1994) and Robinson 
and Sorkin’s (1985) contingent criterion model.  
Results and conclusion: Automation-aided sensitivity hewed closest to the 
predictions of the two least efficient collaborative models, well short of statistically ideal 
levels. Performance was similar whether the aid provided graded or binary judgments. Model 
comparisons identified potential strategies by which participants integrated their judgments 
with the aid’s. 
Application: Results lend insight into participants’ automation-aided decision 
strategies, and provide benchmarks for predicting automation-aided performance levels. 
Keywords: human-automation interaction, signal detection theory, decision-making 
strategies, contingent criterion model 
BENCHMARKING AIDED DECISIONS 2 
Benchmarking Aided Decision Making in a Signal Detection Task 
Human operators in everyday and professional contexts work with the assistance of 
automated decision aids. The assisted tasks often take the form of binary signal detection 
judgments, which ask a decision maker to classify potentially ambiguous states of the world 
into either of two discrete categories (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 
A credibility assessment aid, for instance, might help organizational decision makers 
distinguish deceptive from honest responses when questioning interviewees in negotiations or 
investigations (Jensen, Lowry, & Jenkins, 2011). Analogously, a combat identification 
system might help soldiers distinguish friends from foes on the battlefield (Wang, Jamieson, 
& Hollands, 2009). Ideally, assistance from an automated aid will help the human operator to 
achieve higher levels of sensitivity, the ability to distinguish between states of the world. But 
like the human operator, an automated decision aid performing a signal detection task is 
typically required to render judgments based on incomplete or uncertain data. The aid’s 
sensitivity will therefore be imperfect, just as the human operator’s is, and the aid's 
judgments will sometimes be wrong. 
 Imperfect sensitivity does not render an aid inherently useless. Even if the automation 
errs in occasional judgments, the human operator may be able to achieve a higher sensitivity 
with the aid's assistance than without it (Wickens & Dixon, 2007). In practice, unfortunately, 
people often interact with automated aids in a suboptimal way. This may manifest as either 
misuse, a tendency to act on the aid’s judgments uncritically, or disuse, a tendency to 
disregard or underweight the aid’s judgments (Parasuraman, 2000; Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997). These effects compromise the benefits of automated assistance, and in the worst case, 
operators may even perform a task more poorly when assisted by a decision aid than when 
unassisted (e.g., Alberdi, Povyakalo, Strigini, & Ayton, 2004). 
An important goal of automation design is therefore to encourage more efficient 
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human-automation interaction, allowing the automation-aided operator to achieve higher 
levels of sensitivity. Notably, automation-aided performance in a signal detection task can be 
conceptualized as a form of collaborative decision making in which two agents, the human 
and the aid, reach separate judgments about the state of the world and then combine their 
judgments to reach a joint decision (Sorkin & Dai, 1994; Sorkin, Hays, & West, 2001). 
Understanding the process by which the operator integrates his or her own judgment with that 
of the aid may thus allow practitioners to better tailor the design of automated aids, to 
encourage efficient human-automation collaboration. In the worst case, it will allow system 
designers to better predict automation-aided performance levels. 
Using binary cues: The contingent criterion model 
 Many studies of automation-aided decisions have specifically considered the case in 
which an aid provides the human operator binary judgments (e.g., Botzer, Meyer, Pak, & 
Parmet, 2010; Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001; Rice & McCarley, 2011). 
Robinson and Sorkin’s (1985) contingent criterion (CC) model has become the modal 
account of human-automation interaction under these circumstances (e.g., Elvers & Elrif, 
1997; Maltz & Meyer, 2001; Meyer, 2001). The model is built on the framework of signal 
detection theory (SDT) (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). SDT assumes 
that to render a signal detection judgment, the decision maker first encodes evidence for or 
against either of two exhaustive and mutually exclusive potential states of the world, one of 
which is conventionally termed signal and the other noise. The evidence values are 
distributed continuously, and unless the task is trivially easy, the evidence distributions 
corresponding to the two states of the world overlap at least partially. 
 The decision maker transforms continuous evidence values into discrete judgments by 
comparing them to a response criterion. Values below the criterion value lead to a judgment 
of signal absent, and values above it lead to a judgment of signal present. The decision 
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maker’s criterion may be conservative, biased toward judgments of noise; liberal, biased 
toward judgments of signal; or unbiased. Assuming that the signal and noise evidence 
distributions are Gaussian with a common standard deviation (Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005), sensitivity can be measured by the statistic d’,  
d’ = z (HR) – z (FAR), 
and bias by the statistic c, 
c = -0.5 × [z (HR) – z (FAR)]. 
A value of d’ = 0 indicates chance performance, and a value of d’ = 5 indicates near perfect 
performance. Negative values of c indicate liberal bias, positive values indicate conservative 
bias, and a value of 0 indicates unbiasedness. 
The CC model views the aid and the human operator as operating in sequence, with 
the aid rendering its judgment first and the operator establishing his or her own response 
criterion contingent on the aid’s judgment. The operator is thus presumed to operate with a 
relatively liberal response criterion following a judgment of signal present from the aid, and 
with a relatively conservative criterion following a judgment of signal absent from the aid. 
For ease of exposition, we will refer to a signal present judgment asYes and a signal absent 
judgment as No. Team hit rate under the CC model, HRCC, is, 
HRCC = HRaid  (HRoperator|“Yes”) + (1 - HRaid) HRoperator|“No”,  
where HRaid is the hit rate of the automated aid, HRoperator|“Yes” is the hit rate of the unaided 
human operator given a Yes judgment from the aid, and HRoperator|“No” is the hit rate of the 
unaided human operator given a No judgment from the aid. Team false alarm rate under the 
CC model, FARCC, is, 
FARCC = FARaid  (FARoperator|“Yes”) + (1 - FARoperator|“No”) FARoperator|“No”, 
where FARaid is the false alarm rate of the automated aid, FARoperator|“Yes” is the false alarm 
rate of the unaided human operator given a Yes judgment from the aid, and FARoperator|“No” is 
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the false alarm rate of the unaided human operator given a No judgment from the aid.  
Team sensitivity under the CC model, d’CC, is thus,   
d’CC = z (HRCC) – z (FARCC). 
 The operator’s optimal criterion setting following an aid’s judgment is determined by 
the aid’s predictive value (Robinson & Sorkin, 1985). Assuming an unbiased payoff matrix, 
normative bias following a response i from the aid, as measured by the statistic β, is, 
βoptimal = [1-p(signal|i)] / p(signal|i), 
where i is either a Yes or a No. Normative behavior thus entails larger bias shifts in response 
to more reliable automated aids. Data have shown that operators’ response criteria in fact 
shift in the expected direction following a Yes or No judgment from an aid, but that the 
magnitude of these shifts is smaller than predicted by the normative CC model (Elvers & 
Elrif, 1997; Meyer, 2001; Wang et al., 2009). These findings have been taken as evidence 
that operators employ a CC strategy in automation-aided decision tasks, but choose their 
criteria suboptimally (cf., Botzer et al., 2010).  
But while evidence for suboptimal automation use is incontestable, evidence that this 
is the result of a CC process is more tentative. Bias shifts in the direction of an aid's 
recommendation are consistent with a CC strategy. Other information integration strategies, 
however, will also produce differences in response bias conditional on the aid’s decision. In 
fact, any collaborative strategy under which the operator tends to agree with the aid will 
engender differences in the operator’s bias conditional on the aid’s decision. Differences in 
conditional operator bias therefore do not necessarily implicate the decision process 
postulated by the contingent criterion model. Additionally, the suboptimal CC model by itself 
offers little help in anticipating the performance benefits that an automated aid will produce. 
While aided performance will be less than statistically ideal, the model does not specify just 
how far short of that standard it will fall. Phrased differently, whereas the operator’s cued 
BENCHMARKING AIDED DECISIONS 6 
criterion settings are fixed in the optimal CC model, the suboptimal model makes them free 
parameters, providing little a priori basis for predicting the operator’s automation-aided 
sensitivity. Comparing automation-aided performance to the predictions of alternative, fixed-
parameter or parameter-free models may therefore be useful both to identify strategies that 
provide plausible alternative accounts of human-automation decision making, and to establish 
benchmarks that help designers predict the performance levels automation-aided operators 
might attain. 
Alternative models of binary cue use 
A very simple strategy for interacting with an automated aid, proposed as a potential 
strategy for collaborative decision making between pairs of human decision makers, is the 
best decides (BD) model (Bahrami et al., 2010; Denkiewicz, Rączasek-Leonardi, Migdal, & 
Plewczynski, 2013). This model assumes that the human operator knows whether he or she is 
more or less sensitive than the aid. If more sensitive, the operator ignores the aid entirely and 
makes a judgment each trial for him or herself. If less sensitive, the operator defers to the 
aid’s judgments by default. Team sensitivity under the BD model, d’BD, is thus, 
d’BD = max (d’operator, d’aid). 
 
Although simpler than the CC strategy, the BD strategy makes far less efficient use of the 
paired decision makers’ judgments, producing lower levels of automation-aided sensitivity. 
Nonetheless, observed automation-aided performance is often poorer still than predicted by 
the BD model (e.g., Meyer, 2001; Rice & McCarley, 2011). 
Another pair of strategies, the yes/yes (YY) and no/no (NN) decision models proposed 
by Pollack and Madans (1964), are also inefficient, but again seem to outperform human-
automation teams. Under the YY model, both the operator and the aid must report “signal 
present” for the team to produce a collaborative signal present judgment. Conversely, under 
the NN model, both the operator and the aid must report “signal absent” to produce a 
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collaborative signal absent judgment. Since the YY and NN decision models make 
symmetrical predictions, we will only discuss and report the predictions of the NN model. 
Team hit rate under the NN model, HRNN, is, 
 HRNN = 1- (1-HRoperator) (1-HRaid),  
where HRoperator is the hit rate of the unaided human operator. Team false alarm rate under the 
NN model, FARNN, is, 
FARNN = 1- (1-FARoperator) (1-FARaid),  
where FARoperator is the false alarm rate of the unaided human operator. Team sensitivity 
under the NN model, d’NN is thus, 
d’NN = z (HRNN) – z (FARNN), 
and team criterion under the NN model, cNN, is, 
cNN = -1/2 [z (HRNN) + z (FARNN)]. 
Pollack and Madans (1964) found that automation-aided participants achieved sensitivity 
levels lower than predicted by the NN and YY models.  
Adapted to the context of human-automation decision making, Bahrami et al.’s (2010) 
coin flip (CF) model might provide a more plausible and better-fitting process model of 
human-automation performance. The model assumes that if the human operator and aid agree 
on a yes-or-no judgment, that’s the judgment of the team. If they reach different decisions, 
the disagreement is effectively resolved by coin flip, that is, by selecting among the two 
response options randomly and with equal probability. The model thus posits discrete states 
in which the operator either ignores the model’s judgment or defers to it fully. Predictions for 
the CF model in the current work can be made by estimating team hit rate (HR) and false 
alarm rate (FAR) from the individual team member’s HR and FAR, then transforming those 
scores using the standard equation for calculating d’. Assuming that the human operates with 
the same response bias under individual and automation-aided conditions, team hit rate under 
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the CF model, HRCF, is, 
 HRCF = (HRoperator) (HRaid) + 0.5 (HRoperator) (1-HRaid) + 0.5 (1-HRoperator) (HRaid)  
= 0.5(HRoperator + HRaid), 
Team false alarm rate under the CF model, FARCF, is, 
FARCF = (FARoperator) (FARaid ) + 0.5 (FARoperator) (1-FARaid) + 0.5 (1-FARoperator) (FARaid), 
Team sensitivity under the CF model, d’CF, is, 
d’CF = z (HRCF) – z (FARCF), 
and team criterion under the CF model, cCF, is, 
cCF = -1/2 [z (HRCF) – z (FARCF)]. 
 Because the CF model reflects a highly inefficient strategy for combining agents’ 
judgments (Bahrami et al., 2010), it may offer a more plausible account of human-automation 
collaboration than the models discussed above. Alternatively still, we may consider a model 
that is similar but potentially more consonant with empirical findings in the study of decision 
making. Like the CF model, the probability matching (PM) model, posits that yes-or-no 
disagreements between agents are resolved randomly. The PM model, however, assumes that 
the operator defers to the aid's judgment with a probability equal to the aid’s average 
reliability, mimicking a strategy that participants use in probabilistic choice tasks (see 
Koehler & James, 2014; Vulkan, 2000, for reviews), including automation-aided decision 
tasks in which operators have no access to raw data (Bliss, Gilson, & Deaton, 1995; 
Wiegmann, 2002). Team hit rate under the PM model, HRPM, is, 
 HRPM = Raid × HRaid + (1- Raid) × HRoperator, 
where Raid is the aid’s average reliability rate. Team false alarm rate under the PM model, 
FARPM, is, 
FARPM = Raid × FARaid + (1- Raid) × FARoperator, 
Team sensitivity under the PM model, d’PM is,   
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d’PM = z (HRPM) – z (FARPM), 
and team criterion under the PM model, cPM is, 
cPM = -0.5 × [z (HRPM) – z (FARPM)]. 
The CF and PM models can be considered variants of the same discrete-state model, differing 
only in the fixed probability with which the operator defers to the aid. Assuming the 
automated aid’s decisions are more accurate on average than the operator’s, the PM model 
offers an aided decision strategy more efficient than the CF model but nonetheless 
suboptimal. 
Strategies for using direct evidence values 
As noted, the models discussed above presume an aid rendering yes-or-no judgments. 
Phrased differently, they presume an aid that measures the strength of evidence for a signal 
and then applies a decision rule to transform that strength estimate into a binary judgment. 
Some empirical studies have examined variations on this design in which the aid renders 
confidence-graded judgments on a scale of more than two levels, providing a more fine-
grained assessment of the evidence for or against a signal, but even in these cases the aid's 
judgments have been discretized. Automated aids in one study, for example, provided 
participants alarms on a 4-level scale, where the lowest level was the absence of a signal and 
the highest level denoted an urgent alarm (Sorkin, Kantowitz, & Kantowitz, 1988). A visual 
search aid in another study ranked potential target locations on a 5-level scale (St. John & 
Manes, 2002). Both of these studies found evidence for better human performance with 
graded than with binary automated cues, as have some others (Andre & Cutler, 1998; Gupta, 
Bisantz, & Singh, 2002; McCarley, 2009; Wiczorek & Manzey, 2014). Other research, 
however, has failed to replicate this benefit (Wickens & Colcombe, 2007; Wiczorek, 
Manzey, & Zirk, 2014).  
An alternative and less-explored design option is to allow the aid to share its evidence 
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estimates directly. By preserving information that is lost when responses are discretized, such 
direct evidence sharing offers the potential of better human-automation performance than is 
achievable with standard, discrete judgments from an aid (Bahrami et al., 2010). The optimal 
weighting (OW) model (Bahrami et al., 2010; Sorkin & Dai, 1994; Sorkin et al., 2001), built 
on the assumption of direct evidence sharing from the aid, in fact offers the strategy for best-
possible automation-aided performance. The model assumes that the human and the 
automated aid both operate as equal-variance Gaussian signal-detectors (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). Each trial, both agents assess the stimulus independently and estimate the 
likelihood that it contains a signal. The automated aid reports its likelihood estimate to the 
human operator, with the automation-aided decision based on a weighted average, Z, of these 
estimates, 
Z = ΣaiXi,  
where i indexes the agent, human or automation, ai is the weight applied to agent i's estimate, 
and Xi is that estimate. Assuming the human and aid's judgments are stochastically 
independent, the optimal weight for agent i is proportional to the agent's sensitivity, d'i. In the 
context of automation-aided decision making, team sensitivity under the OW model, d’OW, is, 
d’OW = (d’operator + d’aid)
1/2. 
Another model for using direct evidence judgments from the aid, the uniform 
weighting (UW) model, is identical to the OW model except that it assumes that the operator 
assigns equal weights to the two estimates of signal likelihood when averaging them, i.e., that 
ahuman = aaid (Sorkin et al., 2001). In this case, team sensitivity under the UW model, d’UW, is, 
d’UW = (d’operator + d’aid)/2
1/2. 
If the aid and operator are equally sensitive, the UW model is equivalent to the OW model. 
Otherwise, d’UW is lower than d’OW. 
 Comparing the performance of the OW and UW models to the performance of the 
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models discussed above suggests that human operators may benefit more from an aid that 
shares its evidence assessments directly, without discretizing responses. As yet, though, this 
possibility apparently has not been tested empirically. 
The current experiments 
The models above span a range of performance levels, from perfectly efficient to 
highly inefficient. The present series of experiments tested the performance of automation-
aided decision makers in a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task against the models to 
investigate human operators’ strategies for interacting with an automated decision aid, and to 
benchmark empirical automation-aided performance. Participants viewed orange and blue 
random-dot images, and were asked to determine each trial which color was dominant (Voss, 
Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). They performed the task alone or with assistance from an 
automated decision aid. The aid rendered its judgment either in the form of a binary diagnosis 
accompanied by an estimate of signal strength (Experiments 1 and 3), or simply as a binary 
diagnosis (Experiment 2). The predictions for each collaborative model were calculated from 
the participant’s unaided sensitivity and the sensitivity of the aid. Observed collaborative 
sensitivity values were then compared to the statistically optimal values predicted by each 
model.  
This research complied with the tenets of the Declaration of Helsinki and was 
approved by the Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee at Flinders University. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants.    
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 40 adults (mean age = 20.97 years, SD = 3.76, 
range = 17-35; 34 females, 6 males) recruited from the Flinders University of South 
Australia. All participants were compensated with $10.00 AUD for an experimental 
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session that lasted approximately 45 min. Participants were fluent in English, had 
normal color vision, and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.  
Apparatus and Stimuli. The experimental task was controlled by E-prime 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA), and stimuli were presented on a 
23-inch Samsung monitor with a resolution of 1,920 x 1,080 pixels and a 120 Hz 
refresh rate. Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the monitor, with 
viewing distance unconstrained.  
Stimuli were 300 blue and orange random dot images (256 x 256 pixels). 
Figure 1 shows a sample orange-dominant stimulus image. Each stimulus was either 
blue-dominant or orange-dominant. In the blue-dominant stimuli, each pixel was 
randomly assigned the color blue with a probability of 0.52 or the color orange with a 









Figure 1. A sample orange-dominant stimulus image.  
Procedure. Participants performed a 2AFC task requiring them to classify 
stimulus images as blue- or orange-dominant. A cover story asked the participants to 
imagine themselves as geologists sorting samples of a fictional mineral Vibranium 
into blue and orange strains. The instructions informed them, “Unfortunately, the two 
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strains are difficult to tell apart. Both are speckled blue and orange. The only 
difference visually is that one strain tends to have a little more orange, and the other 
tends to have a little more blue. For simplicity, we will call them VBN-ORANGE and 
VBN-BLUE. However, there is a lot of overlap in their appearance, and it is almost 
impossible to sort them with 100% accuracy by eye.” Participants were asked to press 
the number 1 on the keyboard if they thought the image was mostly orange, and to 
press the number 3 on the keyboard if they thought the image was mostly blue. 
Participants were also told that on some trials, they would be assisted by an 
automated decision aid that would provide a binary blue or orange judgment along 
with an estimate of signal strength. Instructions read, “The aid works by testing the 
chemical properties of the sample, and then assessing whether the sample is more 
likely to be VBN-ORANGE or VBN-BLUE. However, just like a human judge, the 
aid can sometimes make mistakes; testing has shown that on average, the aid is 
correct 93% of the time and incorrect 7% of the time. To help you predict whether it 
is right or wrong, the aid will give its assessment along with a numeric rating each 
trial. A higher rating means that the aid is more likely to be correct. The aid will 
provide its assessment and rating at the start of each trial. You should use the aid to 
help you make your decisions, but be aware that you are free to disagree with it any 
time you wish. Use your own best judgement.”  
The aid’s judgments were calculated using an equal-variance Gaussian signal 
detection model. Evidence values for blue-dominant images were sampled from a 
Gaussian distribution with a mean of -1.5 and a standard deviation of 1, and evidence 
values for orange-dominant images were sampled from a Gaussian distribution with a 
mean of 1.5 and a standard deviation of 1. Thus, the d’ of the aid was 3. The aid 
transformed evidence values into binary judgments using an unbiased response 
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threshold, offering a judgment of blue-dominant if the evidence value sampled for a 
given trial was less than 0 and a judgment of orange-dominant if the evidence value 
sampled was greater than 0. Given the aid’s d’ of 3, the unbiased criterion produced 
an average accuracy rate of 93%. The aid’s estimate of signal strength was simply the 
absolute value of the sampled evidence value. As noted, participants were informed 
that a higher value indicated stronger evidence. Because they were generally not 
expected to have had extensive formal training in statistics, however, they were not 
provided any additional information about the distribution of evidence values. 
Figure 2 shows the sequence of events within an automation-aided trial for 
Experiment 1. Each trial was initiated with a key press from the participant. This was 
followed by a 1,000-ms fixation screen, a 1,000-ms screen displaying the automated 
aid’s diagnosis, and then the stimulus display. On aided trials participants were 
provided with the aid’s diagnosis, e.g., “Aid judges: Orange 2.14.” On unaided trials, 
participants were instead provided with a neutral message, “Waiting for sample.” 
Presentation of the aid’s diagnosis before the stimulus display allowed participants 
time to attend to the diagnosis carefully, and ensured that the diagnosis and stimulus 
arrived in the same order in which the CC model presumes they are processed (though 
see Wiegmann, McCarley, Kramer, & Wickens, 2006, for evidence that automation 
dependence is similar regardless of the order in which cue and stimulus are 
presented). Other models make no presumption as to the order of processing. The 
neutral message served to match the sequence and timing of events across the aided 
and unaided blocks. The stimulus display remained onscreen until the participant’s 
response. At the end of each trial, participants received a 1,500-ms feedback message 
of either “Correct!” or “Incorrect!” 
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Figure 2. The sequence of events within an automation-aided trial for Experiment 1. 
Each session comprised a block of 50 unaided practice trials followed by a 
block of 50 aided practice trials, then a block of 100 unaided experimental trials and a 
block of 100 aided experimental trials, with the order of the experimental blocks 
counterbalanced across participants. The order of stimulus images viewed within 
blocks was randomized across trials. Participants were allowed to rest between 
blocks. An experimental session lasted approximately 45 min. 
Analysis 
For analysis, orange-dominant stimuli were treated as signal events and blue-
dominant stimuli as noise events. For clarity of exposition below, we refer to orange 
and blue judgments as yes and no judgments, respectively. Hit rates and false alarm 
rates were calculated from the participants’ responses, and data were converted to 
signal detection measures of sensitivity and bias, d’ and c (Green & Swets, 1966; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). A prior of 0.5 was added 
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to the raw response frequency value in each cell of the 2 x 2 SDT matrix for each 
participant to correct for perfect hit and false alarm rates (Hautus, 1995). Data from 
practice trials were excluded from analysis. 
Data analysis employed Bayesian parameter estimation using a Markov chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling procedure (Kruschke, 2013, 2015; Lee & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). This approach begins by assuming a prior distribution on a 
parameter value of interest, then updates the prior through probabilistic sampling to 
approximate the posterior distribution on parameter values in light of the observed 
data.  
Analyses were conducted using sampling functions from the package JAGS 
(Plummer, 2015) in the R programming language (http://www.r-project.org). All 
parameters were assumed to follow normal distributions, with vague priors on their 
means and standard deviations (means ~ N[0, 1 × 106]; standard deviations ~ 
1/Γ[.001, .001]). The use of vague priors ensures that the analysis does not commit a 
priori to strong conclusions, and allows the observed data to dominate the posterior 
distribution. Each estimate was based on four MCMC chains, run for 10,000 burn-in 
steps followed by 100,000 sample steps each. Chains were thinned to every fourth 
step in order to reduce sample autocorrelation, leaving a total of 100,000 samples for 
analysis. All estimated parameters showed values of the Gelman-Rubin statistic 
(Gelman & Rubin, 1992) of 1.01 or less, indicating satisfactory convergence of the 
MCMC chains (Kruschke, 2015). 
Descriptive statistics reported include the mean and 95% highest density 
intervals (HDI) for the estimated posterior distributions (Kruschke, 2013). The 95% 
HDI is the region that contains 95% of the posterior distribution mass, and within 
which all values have higher probability than any values outside the region. If the 
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distribution is unimodal and symmetrical, the 95% HDI is equivalent to the central 
95% region of the posterior (Gelman et al., 2013). Where it is useful to compare 
measures to a value of 0—for example, when examining differences between aided 
and unaided performance, or between observed data and model predictions—the 
reported statistics also include the proportion of the estimated posterior distribution 
that lies above or below 0 (Kruschke, 2013). Values are reported with the 
nomenclature x% < 0 < y%. For example, 1% < 0 < 99% indicates that 1% of the 
posterior distribution lies below 0, and 99% lies above. We describe an effect as 
credible if the 95% HDI on the difference between conditions does not overlap 0, and 
we describe an effect as decisive if more than 99% of the posterior distribution on 
difference scores falls to one side of 0 (cf. Jeffreys, 1961; Wetzels et al., 2011). 
Results 
Table 1 presents participants’ mean hit and false alarm rates for the unaided 
and aided conditions of Experiments 1–3. The gray bars of Figure 3 present the 
corresponding mean values of d’. The gray bars of Figure 4 present participants’ 
mean values of the bias measure c in the automation-aided conditions of Experiments 
1–3, contingent on the aid’s binary judgment. Dotted lines in Figures 3 and 4 present 
model-predicted values. Results for Experiment 1 appear in the left data column of 
the table and left panels of the figures. 
Data were excluded from four participants in Experiment 1 who failed to 
achieve an unaided d’ score of at least 0.5, suggesting a failure to understand or 
comply with the instructions. Including these participants' data in the analyses below 
did not change the pattern of results. 
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Sensitivity. Automation-aided d’ decisively exceeded unaided d’, Mdiff = 0.48, 
95% HDI [0.20, 0.75], 0% < 0 < 100%, confirming that assistance from the aid 
improved participants’ sensitivity. 
To assess model performance, analyses compared observed d’ scores from the 
automation-aided conditions to the model-predicted scores based on the participants’ 
unaided sensitivity. Mean model error scores (predicted scores minus observed 
scores) are presented in the text, with 95% HDIs. The two models that took into 
account the aid’s graded evidence judgments, the OW model, Merr = 1.06, 95% HDI 
[0.86, 1.28], 0% < 0 < 100%, and the UW model, Merr = 0.97, 95% HDI [0.75, 1.19], 
0% < 0 < 100%, both decisively overestimated participants’ automation-aided 
sensitivity, as did the three most efficient of the binary-cue models, Merr = 0.75, 95% 
HDI [0.54, 0.96], 0% < 0 < 100% for the optimal CC model, Merr = 0.52, 95% HDI 
[0.31, 0.72], 0% < 0 < 100% for the NN model, and Merr = 0.37, 95% HDI [0.18, 
0.56], 0% < 0 < 100% for the BD model. In contrast, the CF model decisively 
underestimated participants’ aided sensitivity, Merr = -0.23, 95% HDI [-0.43, -0.03], 
99% < 0 < 1%. Observed sensitivity did not differ credibly from the predictions of the 
PM model, Merr = 0.16, 95% HDI [-0.04, 0.36], 6% < 0 < 94%. 
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Table 1 
Mean Hit and False Alarm Rates and 95% HDIs (in brackets) for the Unaided and 














Figure 3. Mean d’ values (gray bars) and model predictions (dotted lines) for 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Error bars indicate 95% highest-density intervals.  
Bias. Observed levels of automation-aided sensitivity fell closest to the 
predictions of the PM model, which holds that the operator defers to the aid with a 
probability equal to the aid’s average reliability. One interpretation of this finding is 
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is that participants were using a different strategy, but one which happened to mimic 
the sensitivity of the PM model. As a further test of the models, analyses compared 
the participants’ automation-aided response bias, contingent on the aid’s judgment, to 
the predictions of the NN, CF, optimal CC, and PM models. Note that the predicted 
bias for trials on which the aid provided a Yes judgment is negative infinity under the 
NN model, and is therefore not shown in Figure 4. 
As expected, observed bias was decisively more liberal when the aid gave a 
Yes judgment than when it gave a No judgment, Mdiff = 1.26, 95% HDI [1.03, 1.49], 
0% < 0 < 100%, confirming that participants’ responses were biased in the direction 
of the aid’s judgments. The magnitude of the observed shifts, however, did not 
closely match the predictions of any of the models under consideration. For trials on 
which the aid issued a Yes judgment, observed bias was decisively more conservative 
than predicted by the PM model, Merr = -1.38, 95% HDI [-1.54, -1.22], 100% < 0 < 
0%, the optimal CC model, Merr = -0.73, 95% HDI [-0.95, -0.50], 100% < 0 < 0%, or 
the CF model, Merr = -0.24, 95% HDI [-0.41, -0.07], 100% < 0 < 0%. For trials on 
which the aid issued a No judgment, observed bias was decisively more liberal than 
predicted by the PM model, Merr = 1.36, 95% HDI [1.20, 1.51], 0% < 0 < 100%, the 
optimal CC model, Merr = 0.67, 95% HDI [0.47, 0.86], 0% < 0 < 100%, or the CF 
model, Merr = 0.24, 95% HDI [0.08, 0.40], 0% < 0 < 100%, and decisively more 
conservative than predicted by the NN model, Merr = -0.61, 95% HDI [-0.78, -0.44], 
100% < 0 < 0%.  
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Figure 4. Mean of the observed (gray bars) and model-predicted (dotted lines) c 
values for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, contingent on the aid’s judgment. The left bar 
within each panel corresponds to trials on which the aid provided a Yes judgment, and 
the right bar corresponds to trials on which the aid provided a No judgment. Error 
bars indicate 95% highest-density intervals.  
Discussion 
Automation-aided sensitivity fell closest to the predictions of the PM model. 
Aided values of c, however, were far less extreme than the PM model predicted, and 
did not match any of the models' predictions closely. But what's perhaps most 
surprising is that participants appear to have made little or no use of the aid's graded 
evidence values, substantially underperforming both the OW and UW models. In 
other words, aided performance was no better than could have been obtained even if 
the aid had provided only binary judgments. Experiment 2 pursued this result. 
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Experiment 2 
Automation-aided participants in Experiment 1 far underperformed the OW 
and UW models, suggesting they made little use of the automated aid’s graded 
evidence outputs. Experiment 2 tested this possibility by replicating the procedure of 
Experiment 1, but only providing participants with a binary judgment from the aid 
each trial. If participants derived no benefit from the aid’s signal strength ratings in 
the first experiment, performance in Experiment 2 should match that of Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 37 adults (mean age = 22.45 years, SD = 5.41, 
range = 17-39; 26 females, 11 males) recruited from the Flinders University of South 
Australia, none of whom had taken part in Experiment 1. All participants were 
compensated with $10.00 AUD for an experimental session that lasted approximately 
45 minutes. Participants were fluent in English, had normal color vision, and normal 
or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.  
Apparatus and Stimuli. Apparatus and stimuli were identical to those of 
Experiment 1, except that participants received only a binary, orange-or-blue 
judgment from the aid each trial. 
Procedure. Experimental procedure and data treatment were similar to those 
of Experiment 1. Instructions were identical to those of Experiment 1, but modified to 
omit any mention of continuous values from the aid. Participants were advised 
simply, “The aid will provide its assessment at the start of each trial.” 
Results 
Results for Experiment 2 appear in the middle data column of Table 1 and the 
middle panels of Figures 3 and 4. Data were excluded from one participant who failed 
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to achieve an unaided d’ score of at least 0.5. Including that participants' data in the 
analyses below did not change the pattern of results. 
 Sensitivity. Automation-aided sensitivity exceeded unaided sensitivity by a 
mean of Mdiff = 0.55, 95% HDI [0.35, 0.76], 0% < 0 < 100%, with a credible interval 
that clearly excluded 0, indicating that assistance from the aid again improved 
participants’ sensitivity.  
As in the first experiment, however, the participants’ aided performance was 
poor relative to the predictions of the most efficient decision models under 
consideration. Both the OW model, Merr = 0.98, 95% HDI [0.80, 1.15], 0% < 0 < 
100%, and the UW model, Merr = 0.90, 95% HDI [0.73, 1.08], 0% < 0 < 100%, 
decisively overestimated aided sensitivity. This is unsurprising, given that OW and 
UW performance is unattainable based only on binary judgments from the aid. 
However, aided performance also fell decisively below the levels predicted by the 
optimal CC model, Merr = 0.65, 95% HDI [0.47, 0.82], 0% < 0 < 100%, and the NN 
model, Merr = 0.45, 95% HDI [0.27, 0.62], 0% < 0 < 100%, and credibly below the 
levels predicted by the BD model, Merr = 0.25, 95% HDI [0.05, 0.44], 1% < 0 < 99%. 
In contrast, aided sensitivity was decisively better than predicted by the CF model, 
Merr = -0.28, 95% HDI [-0.45, -0.11], 100% < 0 < 0%, and again did not differ 
credibly from the predictions of the PM model, Merr = 0.08, 95% HDI [-0.11, 0.28], 
20% < 0 < 80%.  
Bias. Observed bias was again decisively more liberal when the aid responded 
Yes than when it responded No, Mdiff = 1.33, 95% HDI [1.09, 1.58], 0% < 0 < 100%. 
For trials on which the aid issued a Yes judgment, observed bias was more 
conservative than predicted by the PM model, Merr = -1.43, 95% HDI [-1.58, -1.28], 
100% < 0 < 0%, the optimal CC model, Merr = -0.75, 95% HDI [-0.99, -0.50], 100% < 
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0 < 0%, or the CF model, Merr = -0.28, 95% HDI [-0.44, -0.13], 100% < 0 < 0%. For 
trials on which the aid issued a No judgment, observed bias was decisively more 
liberal than predicted by either the PM model, Merr = 1.23, 95% HDI [1.05, 1.41], 0% 
< 0 < 100%, or the optimal CC model, Merr = 0.50, 95% HDI [0.28, 0.72], 0% < 0 < 
100%, and decisively more conservative than predicted by the NN model, Merr = -
0.72, 95% HDI [-0.90, -0.53], 100% < 0 < 0%. Observed bias after a No from the aid 
did not differ credibly from that predicted by the CF model, Merr = 0.11, 95% HDI [-
0.07, 0.30], 11% < 0 < 89%. 
Cross-experiment comparison. Assistance from the automated aid increased 
participants’ d’ by 0.48 in Experiment 1 and 0.55 in Experiment 2, Mdiff = 0.07, 95% 
HDI [-0.27, 0.41], 35% < 0 < 65%, giving no credible evidence that graded evidence 
values offered by the aid in Experiment 1 helped participants achieve higher 
sensitivity. In fact, though the difference was statistically negligible, automation-
aided sensitivity trended higher in the second experiment than in the first. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 produced a pattern of effects highly similar to that of 
Experiment 1, suggesting that participants made little use of the aid’s graded evidence 
values in the first experiment. Results affirm more generally that automation-aided 
performance was highly inefficient, roughly matching the predictions of the PM 
model, but that participants’ cue-contingent response bias did not closely match the 
predictions of any of the models tested. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 1found highly inefficient automation use, even with graded 
estimates of signal strength from the aid. Experiment 3 sought to confirm this result 
with a close replication of the first experiment. As a modest extension, a scoring 
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system was incorporated to provide an overt performance incentive and help 
participants better track their performance over trials.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 36 adults (mean age = 22.16 years, SD = 4.71, 
range = 17-35; 30 females, 6 males) recruited from the Flinders University of South 
Australia, none of whom had taken part in Experiment 1 or 2. All participants were 
compensated with $10.00 AUD for an experimental session that lasted approximately 
45 minutes. Participants were fluent in English, had normal color vision, and normal 
or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.  
Apparatus and stimuli. Apparatus and stimuli were identical to those of 
Experiment 1, except that a point score and running total score was provided with the 
feedback screen each trial. 
Procedure. Experimental procedure and data treatment were similar to those 
of Experiment 1, except as follows. Instructions were identical to those of Experiment 
1, but modified to account for the point system. Participants were advised, “You will 
be scored on your performance, as Marvel Mining has declared that incorrect sorting 
of the strains has been detrimental. You will receive 5 POINTS for every correct 
judgment, and you will be deducted 5 POINTS for every incorrect judgment.” The 
total score that could be obtained in the experimental trials was 1,000 points.  
At the conclusion of each trial, participants received a 1500ms feedback 
message of “Correct! +5, Total score = score” for all correct responses, and 
“Incorrect! -5, Total score = score” for all errors. 
Results 
Results for Experiment 3 appear in the right data column of Table 1 and the 
right panels of Figures 3 and 4. 
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Sensitivity. As in the first two experiments, assistance from the automated aid 
decisively improved participants’ d’, Mdiff = 0.58, 95% HDI [0.33, 0.83], 0% < 0 < 
100%. Again, though, aided performance was highly inefficient. The OW, Merr = 
0.97, 95% HDI [0.76, 1.19], 0% < 0 < 100%, UW, Merr = 0.88, 95% HDI [0.66, 1.10], 
0% < 0 < 100%, optimal CC, Merr = 0.66, 95% HDI [0.44, 0.87], 0% < 0 < 100%, and 
NN models, Merr = 0.40, 95% HDI [0.19, 0.62], 0% < 0 < 100%, all decisively 
overestimated aided sensitivity, and the CF model was once more the only model to 
decisively underestimate it, Merr = -0.31, 95% HDI [-0.52, -0.10], 100% < 0 < 0%. 
Although the BD model again tended to overestimate aided sensitivity, Merr = 0.24, 
95% HDI [0.00, 0.49], 3% < 0 < 97%, the difference between its predictions and 
observed performance in this case just failed to reach 95% credibility. As in the 
earlier experiments, however, observed performance fell closest to the predictions of 
the PM model, Merr = 0.08, 95% HDI [-0.17, 0.31], 26% < 0 < 74%. 
Bias. As expected, observed bias was decisively more liberal when the aid 
responded Yes, than when it responded No, Mdiff = 1.27, 95% HDI [0.98, 1.57], 0% < 
0 < 100%. For trials on which the aid issued a Yes judgment, observed bias was 
decisively more conservative than predicted by either the PM, Merr = -1.33, 95% HDI 
[-1.52, -1.13], 100% < 0 < 0%, or optimal CC model, Merr = -0.78, 95% HDI [-1.13, -
0.42], 100% < 0 < 0%. Observed bias trended more liberal than predicted by the CF 
model, Merr = -0.18, 95% HDI [-0.38, 0.01], 96% < 0 < 4%, though the difference was 
just short of credible. For trials on which the aid issued a No judgment, observed bias 
was decisively more liberal than predicted by either the PM, Merr = 1.39, 95% HDI 
[1.21, 1.57], 0% < 0 < 100%, the optimal CC, Merr = 0.77, 95% HDI [0.43, 1.10], 0% 
< 0 < 100%, or CF model, Merr = 0.28, 95% HDI [0.09, 0.47], 0% < 0 < 100%, and 
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decisively more conservative than predicted by the NN model, Mdiff = -0.54, 95% HDI 
[-0.75, -0.34], 100% < 0 < 0%. 
Cross-experiment comparison. Assistance from the automated-aid increased 
participants’ d’ by 0.48 in Experiment 1 and 0.58 in Experiment 3, Mdiff = 0.10, 95% 
HDI [-0.27, 0.47], 29% < 0 < 71%, giving little evidence that the point system of 
Experiment 3 improved participants’ automation use. This does not imply that with 
more data the modest performance difference between experiments might not become 
credible, or that stronger incentives or different feedback might not induce more 
efficient automation use, but it does lend confidence that the effects seen in 
Experiment 1 are generally robust. 
Meta-analysis 
To estimate the discrepancies between observed data and model predictions 
more precisely, we combined the data of all three experiments and repeated the 
analyses reported above on the aggregated data.  
Consistent with the conclusions above, aggregated sensitivity was decisively 
higher in the aided condition than in the unaided condition, Mdiff = 0.54, 95% HDI 
[0.40, 0.67], 0% < 0 < 100%, but was nonetheless highly inefficient. The five most 
efficient models under consideration all decisively overestimated automation-aided 
sensitivity, Merr = 1.00, 95% HDI [0.89, 1.12], 0% < 0 < 100% for the OW model, 
Merr = 0.92, 95% HDI [0.80, 1.03], 0% < 0 < 100% for the UW model, Merr = 0.69, 
95% HDI [0.57, 0.80], 0% < 0 < 100% for the optimal CC model, Merr = 0.46, 95% 
HDI [0.34, 0.57], 0% < 0 < 100% for the NN model, and Merr = 0.29, 95% HDI [0.17, 
0.41], 0% < 0 < 100% for the BD model, and only the CF model decisively 
underestimated it, Merr = -0.27, 95% HDI [-0.38, -0.16], 100% < 0 < 0%. As above, 
the PM model came closest to matching observed performance levels. With the 
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additional statistical resolution allowed by the aggregated data set, however, the 
discrepancy between the model’s predictions and observed performance approached 
95% credibility, Merr = 0.11, 95% HDI [-0.01, 0.22], 4% < 0 < 96%.  
For trials on which the aid issued a Yes judgment, aggregated bias data were 
decisively more conservative than the predictions of either the PM, Merr = -1.38, 95% 
HDI [-1.47, -1.28], 100% < 0 < 0%, optimal CC, Merr = -0.75, 95% HDI [-0.91, -
0.59], 100% < 0 < 0%, or CF model, Merr = -0.23, 95% HDI [-0.33, -0.14], 100% < 0 
< 0%. For trials on which the aid issued a No judgment, aggregated bias data were 
decisively more liberal than the predictions of either the PM, Merr = 1.33, 95% HDI 
[1.23, 1.43], 0% < 0 < 100%, optimal CC, Merr = 0.64, 95% HDI [0.50, 0.79], 0% < 0 
< 100%, or CF model, Merr = 0.21, 95% HDI [0.11, 0.31], 0% < 0 < 100%, and 
decisively more conservative than the predictions of the NN model, Merr = -0.62, 95% 
HDI [-0.73, -0.52], 100% < 0 < 0%. 
In summary, when data were aggregated across experiments, aided sensitivity 
fell closest to the predictions of the PM model, but differed from them with borderline 
credibility. Conditionalized bias data remained inconsistent with any of the models 
under consideration. 
Model comparisons 
The results above imply that the PM model may be useful as a heuristic for roughly 
predicting automation-aided sensitivity, but that participants likely did not employ the PM 
strategy, or any of the other parameter-free or fixed-parameter strategies under consideration, 
to make aided decisions. This allows that the data may instead be most compatible with a 
suboptimal CC model (Robinson & Sorkin, 1985), under which participants make 
automation-assisted judgments by shifting their response criterion in the direction stipulated 
by the aid’s decision, but to an inadequate degree. However, the analyses above did not test 
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the performance of the suboptimal CC model, and thus provide no direct evidence in support 
of the model. They also considered sensitivity and bias data separately, rather than jointly. 
We therefore conducted a model-fitting analysis to compare the performance of the CC 
model to that of the other models discussed above.  
Method 
Models were fit using an MCMC Bayesian estimation. Because the empirical data 
indicated that participants made little use of the aid’s graded judgments, only models that 
relied exclusively on binary cues from the aid were considered. Four models were compared: 
a CC model, a variant of the CF/PM models that we will call the discrete-state deferment 
model, the BD model, and the NN model. Unaided sensitivity in all four cases was estimated 
using the hierarchical signal detection model described by Lee and Wagenmakers (2014). At 
the top level, the model assumes population distributions of sensitivity (d’) and criterion (c) 
values. At the level below, it assumes that individual participants render judgments using an 
equal-variance Gaussian signal detection model with d’ and c values sampled from the 
population distributions. Finally, individual participants’ d’ and c values are reparameterized 
as hit and false alarm rates, and used to predict raw hit and false alarm counts from a 
binomial distribution. Population distributions of d’ and c are assumed to be described by 
normal distributions, with vague priors on their means and standard deviations (means ~ N[0, 
.00001]; standard deviations ~ 1/Γ[.001, .001]). 
Aided sensitivity was estimated differently across the four models. All four models 
assumed that participants made their own judgments in the aided condition with the same 
sensitivity as in the unaided condition, and that participants received correct judgments from 
the aid on 93% of all trials. The models differed in the manner by which they combined the 
participants’ and aid’s judgments. The CC model (Robinson & Sorkin, 1985) treated 
participants’ response criteria as free parameters, estimating separate values for trials on 
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which the aid responded No and trials on which the aid responded Yes. It therefore subsumed 
the optimal and suboptimal CC models: cue-contingent criterion values that matched the 
normative values would signal optimal performance, and values that deviated from normative 
would signal suboptimal performance. The model assumed that criteria for Yes and No trials 
were normally distributed with the same prior distributions as the criteria for unaided trials. 
In the discrete-state deferment model, participants resolved disagreements with the 
aid by deferring to the aid’s judgment with a fixed probability. The probability of deferring to 
the aid was treated as a free parameter described by a beta distribution at the population level. 
The beta distribution is defined on the interval [0, 1], and is characterized by two parameters 
(Kruschke, 2015). In the parameterization used here, these parameters were the mode, ω, and 
concentration, κ, of the distribution. A value of κ = 2 produces a uniform distribution on the 
interval [0, 1]. Higher values produce more peaked distributions. The model therefore 
subsumed the CF and PM models discussed above: a distribution of deferment probabilities 
peaked tightly around a mode of 0.50 would indicate behavior consistent with the CF model, 
and a distribution peaked tightly around 0.93 would indicate behavior consistent with the PM 
model. The parameters ω and κ were assigned vague priors (both ~ Γ[.001, .001]). 
Finally, the NN model assumed that an aided participant issued a No response only in 
the event that both the aid and the participant reached independent judgments of No, and the 
BD model assumed that decisions in aided blocks were made by whichever agent, human or 
aid, had higher sensitivity. 
Each simulation employed four MCMC chains, run for 10,000 burn-in steps followed 
by 100,000 sample steps each. Chains were thinned to every fourth step, leaving a total of 
50,000 samples for analysis. All estimated parameters showed values of the Gelman-Rubin 
statistic (Gelman & Rubin, 1992) of 1.01 or less. Model performance was compared using the 
Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & van Der Linde, 2002), a 
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measure that rewards a model for goodness-of-fit but penalizes it for complexity (Myung & 
Pitt, 1997). Smaller values denote a better-fitting model. As a rule of thumb, a difference of 
DIC in the range of 3 to 7 is regarded as considerable evidence in favor of the better-fitting 
model (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). 
Results 
Of the four models under comparison, the NN produced clearly the worst 
performance, DIC = 4120, followed by the BD, DIC = 2652. The discrete-state deferment 
model performed better, producing a DIC of 2377. The mean posterior value of ω, the modal 
estimated rate with which participants deferred to the aid, was 0.50, 95% HDI [0.01, 0.96], a 
value superficially consistent with a CF strategy. However, the mean estimated posterior 
value of κ, the concentration of deferment rates around the modal value, was 2.00, 95% HDI 
[2.00, 2.00], indicating that deferment rates across participants were very close to uniformly 
distributed between 0 and 1. Accordingly, the 95% HDI on ω spanned almost the full range 
of values between 0 and 1. Model fits thus revealed no tendency for participants to cluster 
around any particular deferment rate, that is, no consistency in automation use across 
participants. This implies that fixing the value of κ at 2 should improve the model’s DIC, 
reducing model complexity without sacrificing goodness-of-fit. Consistent with this, running 
the model with κ as a fixed parameter of value 2 produced a DIC of 2374, better than was 
achieved by treating κ as a free parameter. 
The CC model produced a DIC of 2375, nearly equivalent to that for the discrete-state 
deferment model with fixed κ. The estimated means of the participants’ cued criterion values 
were less extreme than optimal, both for trials on which the aid issued a Yes judgment, M = -
0.54, 95% HDI [-0.70, -0.39] for observed c vs. M = -1.19, 95% HDI [-1.28, -1.11], for 
optimal c, Mdiff = 0.65, 95% HDI [0.48, 0.81], 0% < 0 < 100%, and for trials on which the aid 
issued a No judgment, M = 0.60, 95% HDI [0.45, 0.76] for observed c vs. M = 1.19, 95% 
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HDI [1.10, 1.28] for optimal c, Mdiff = -0.59, 95% HDI [-0.76, -0.42], 100% < 0 < 0%. HDIs 
around the differences between observed and optimal criterion values clearly excluded 0, 
indicating that a tendency toward overly conservative criterion shifts was highly consistent 
across participants.  
In total, results suggest that data were roughly indifferent between the discrete-state 
deferment model with κ fixed at 2, and a suboptimal, overly-conservative CC model. As 
discussed below, other considerations tilt in favor of the CC model over the discrete state 
model. 
General discussion 
Of the seven fixed-parameter or parameter-free models considered above, the PM 
model most closely predicted participants’ automation-aided sensitivity. Conditionalized on 
the aid’s judgments, however, automation-aided response bias was inconsistent with any of 
the seven models. Thus, despite the rough match between the observed sensitivity data and 
the predictions of the PM model, participants do not seem to have used a PM strategy, or in 
fact to have used any of the fixed-parameter or parameter-free strategies tested.  
How, then, did participants reach their automation-aided decisions? Model 
comparisons were effectively indifferent between a suboptimal CC model and a discrete-state 
deferment model that subsumes the CF and PM models as special cases. The suboptimal CC 
model, as explained above, assumes that participants made automation-assisted decisions by 
shifting their response criterion in the direction stipulated by the aid, but to an inadequate 
degree. The discrete state model assumes that participants resolved disagreements with the 
aid by deferring to the automation’s judgments with some fixed probability. The models 
differ functionally in that the CC model implies that a decision maker is more likely to 
override the aid’s recommendation when she is highly confident in her own judgment, for 
example, on trials when a signal is especially strong. In contrast, the discrete-state model 
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holds that the decision maker is equally likely to override the aid whether or not she is 
confident in her own judgment. This suggests that future work may be better able to 
distinguish the models empirically by examining participants’ automation usage across 
different levels of signal strength. 
Until more decisive empirical tests can be conducted, considerations of plausibility 
(Myung & Pitt, 1997; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002) may best adjudicate between the suboptimal 
CC and discrete-state deferment models, and seem to favor the suboptimal CC account. The 
discrete-state model achieved its best fit by assuming that deferment rates across participants 
were uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. In other words, it posited no consistency across 
individuals in the tendency to depend on the automation. The suboptimal CC model, in 
contrast, implied a consistent pattern of behavior across individuals, with HDIs on cue-
contingent criteria indicating that participants were unanimously too conservative in their 
automation dependence. Although decision makers can most certainly differ in their 
willingness to depend on an automated aid (e.g., Szalma & Taylor, 2011), the possibility that 
they show no consistent tendencies at all seems unlikely, lending credence to the suboptimal 
CC model here. The tendency toward inadequate criterion shifts following a cue from the 
automated decision aid is also consistent with the more general ‘sluggish beta’ phenomenon 
(Chi & Drury, 1998; Neyedli, Hollands, & Jamieson, 2011; Wang et al., 2009), a tendency 
for decision makers in signal detection tasks to adjust their criterion less than they should in 
response to manipulations of signal rates and event payoffs. These various considerations 
tentatively suggest that the optimal CC model offers a more plausible account of automation 
usage than the discrete-state deferment model, even if both produced similar DICs.  
As discussed above, other research has also inferred a suboptimal CC strategy from 
participants’ automation-aided sensitivity and criteria (Elvers & Elrif, 1997; Meyer, 2001; 
Robinson & Sorkin, 1985; Wang et al., 2009). However, the present results go beyond earlier 
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findings by demonstrating that the participants’ suboptimal criterion choice produced 
sensitivity that approached the predictions the PM model. Further research will be necessary 
to generalize this pattern across different forms of signal detection task and varying levels of 
aid reliability, and to identify markers of individual differences (e.g., Merritt & Ilgen, 2008) 
that allow some users to consistently attain higher benchmarks of automation-aided 
efficiency than others. But preliminarily, the data imply that, knowing the d’ of an unaided 
operator and the d’ of an automated aid, system designers can use the PM model to roughly 
predict the operator’s aided sensitivity. These predictions can in turn inform analyses of the 
costs and benefits of building and deploying automated aids. 
The tendency for decision makers to disuse decision aids that are not perfectly reliable 
is of course well-established (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Wickens & Dixon, 2007). The 
finding that participants used automated aids so inefficiently is especially notable here, 
though, because if used well, the aid’s graded strength judgments in Experiments 1 and 3 
could have enabled performance well above even the optimal CC level. In fact, aided 
performance was no better in the first and third experiments than in the second, which offered 
only binary judgments from the aid.  
Data do not make clear why decision makers used the aid’s graded cues so 
inefficiently. Achieving optimal performance would have been challenging in multiple ways. 
First, participants would have had to know, implicitly or explicitly, the statistical properties 
of their own sensory representations corresponding to blue-dominant and orange-dominant 
stimuli. Second, they would have had to know the analogous statistical properties of the aid's 
evidence distributions. Third, they would have had to know how much better or worse their 
sensitivity was than the aid’s. Armed with all of this knowledge, finally, the participants 
would have had to calculate an appropriately weighted average of their own judgment and the 
aid’s each trial.  
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Given these heavy demands, the failure to match the performance of the OW model is 
unsurprising; researchers have long recognized that limits on information and information-
processing abilities place bounds on human cognition that can prevent human decision 
makers from reaching putatively normative performance (Simon, 1955; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Nonetheless, human decision makers can at least approximate the 
performance of a linear cue combination rule (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979), 
and though they tend not to weight cues optimally (e.g., Johnson, Cavanagh, Spooner, & 
Samet, 1973; Montgomery, 1999, 2001; Montgomery & Sorkin, 1996), their deviations from 
normative weighting are likely to have modest effects on performance (Dawes & Corrigan, 
1974; Wainer, 1976). Comparing the predictions of the OW and UW models above, for 
instance, shows that an equal-weighting rule for combining human and automation judgments 
would have approached the performance of the optimal-weighting rule. It therefore seems 
unlikely that participants’ inefficient use of graded evidence values was caused by an 
inability to estimate proper weights for combining judgments. Moreover, even when high 
cognitive load or imperfect information make a linear decision rule difficult or impracticable, 
decision makers can often find nonlinear heuristic strategies that allow near-normative 
performance (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). In the current 
tasks, for example, a simple heuristic rule for using the aid’s graded judgments to resolve 
disagreements between the human and aid might have been to defer to the aid when it 
produced a relatively high evidence value but to override it otherwise. 
Despite these possibilities, the data gave little indication that participants made use of 
the aid’s graded evidence judgments. Rather, the null differences between Experiment 2 and 
Experiments 1 and 3, and the highly inefficient levels of automation-aided performance seen 
in all three experiments, suggest that participants disregarded the aid’s graded outputs 
entirely. This may indicate a tendency for participants to minimize effort expenditure 
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(Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 1990), sacrificing decision accuracy in order to forego the 
short-term cognitive costs of encoding and remembering the aid’s graded assessment each 
trial. Further research will be necessary to determine whether instruction (Sedlmeier & 
Gigerenzer, 2001), changes to the format in which information from the aid is presented 
(Bisantz, 2013; Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000; Todd & Benbasat, 1994), 
or other task and display manipulations might reduce the effort needed to use the aid’s graded 
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